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Recent Developments
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT-PRo SE
LITIGANTS ARE NOT ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD OF ATrORNEY FEEs.

Cunningham v. FBI (3d Cir. 1981)
In 1976 Dale Cunningham, acting under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),1 requested the release of FBI documents relating to
his role in anti-Vietnam War activities. 2 The FBI responded 8 but
withheld many of the documents he had requested. 4 When the FBI
failed to act upon his administrative appeal, 5 Cunningham brought an
action pro se under the FOIA against the FBI in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey.6 Six days later, the FBI
1. Cunningham v. FBI, No. 78-2818, slip op. at 10 (D.N.J. Dec. 7, 1979).
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) sets forth procedures which guarantee
public access to records kept by federal agencies. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
The provision which authorizes disclosure of agency records provides that
"each agency, upon any request for records which (A) reasonably describes such
records and (B) is made in accordance with published rules stating the time,
place, fees (if any), and the procedures to be followed, shall make the records
promptly available to any person." Id. § 552(a)(3).
2. Cunningham v. FBI, No. 78-2818, slip op. at 12-13 (D.N.J. Dec. 7,
1979). In 1971, the Camden 28, a group of anti-Vietnam War activists, raided
a Camden, New Jersey, draft board office. Brief for Appellee at 2, Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1981). Cunningham sought release of FBI
documents relating to his role as a supporter of the Camden 28. Id. at 2-3.
3. Brief for Appellee at 3, Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383 (3d Cir.
1981). By December of 1977, the government had released, with deletions, a
number of documents related to the FBI's investigation of Cunningham. Id.;
Brief for Appellants at 2, Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1981).
4. Brief for Appellee at 2, Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1981).
The record contains no information regarding why the FBI initially withheld
some of the documents. See generally Cunningham v. FBI, No. 78-2818
(D.N.J. Dec. 7, 1979); Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383 (3rd Cir. 1981).
5. Cunningham v. FBI, No. 78-2818, slip op. at 10 (D.N.J. Dec. 7, 1979).
Cunningham filed his administrative appeal on January 4, 1978 and waited
almost 11 months for a response from the FBI. Id. The FOIA provides that
an agency must dispose of an appeal within twenty days of receiving it, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays. 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(6)
(A)(ii) (1976). If the agency fails to dispose of the appeal within this time
limit, the appealing party is deemed to have exhausted his administrative
remedies. Id. § 552(a) (6)(C).
6. 664 F.2d at 383. Cunningham, who was not an attorney, filed and
prosecuted the FOIA suit in his own behalf. Id.
The FOIA specifies that a United States District Court located
in the district in which the complainant resides, or has his principal
place of business, or in which the agency records are situated, or in
the District of Columbia, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from
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released 860 pages of the requested documents. 7 Consequently, the
district court found that Cunningham had "substantially prevailed" 8 in
the case and thus was eligible for an award of attorney fees. The
court then awarded him $523 as reimbursement for out-of-pocket disbursements, 9 and an additional $750 "in lieu of attorney fees." 10 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit "
withholding agency records and to order the production of any
agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.
5 U.S.C, § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976). The Act further provides that the district court
shall examine the matter de novo and that the court may make an in camera
inspection of the agency records to determine whether the records should be
withheld in whole or in part under any of the exemptions under the FOIA. Id.
7. Brief for Appellants at 3, Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383 (3d Cir.
1981). The FBI withheld the remaining documents claiming that they fell
within various FOIA provisions which exempt certain documents from disclosure. Id. Despite this substantial disclosure of documents, Cunningham's
suit was not moot because a FOIA suit becomes moot only if the agency makes
a complete and timely disclosure of the requested documents. 1 J. O'REILLY,
FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 8.15 (1981).
8. 664 F.2d at 383. In spite of a summary judgment against Cunningham
as to most of the remaining documents which the FBI had not released, the
court decided that Cunningham had "substantially prevailed" in the suit. Id.
In order for a court to award attorney fees and costs to a plaintiff under the
FOIA, the plaintiff must have "substantially prevailed" in the suit. See 5
U.S.C. §552(a)(4)(E) (1976). For the definition of "substantially prevailed,"
see note 17 and accompanying text infra.
9. 664 F.2d at 383. The FOIA provides in pertinent part that "[tihe
court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other
litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in which the
complainant has substantially prevailed." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976). For
a discussion of how courts have construed this provision, see notes 21-45 and
accompanying text infra.
10. 664 F.2d at 383. The relevant language of the FOIA simply refers to
"attorney fees" and does not address those situations in which the plaintiff
proceeds pro se. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976). For the pertinent text
of the FOIA, see note 9 supra.
The district court concluded that Cunningham was entitled to an award
of attorney fees on the basis of its evaluation of the congressional policy underlying the FOIA. The court observed:
[T]he test for the award of attorney fees to a complainant who
has substantially prevailed involves balancing four factors: (1) benefit
to the public; (2) commercial benefit to the complainants; (3) nature
of complainant's interest in the records sought; and (4) whether
Government's withholding of records sought had a reasonable basis in
law. .

.

.

Applying these factors to the instant case, the Court finds

that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees. The documents relate to
Plaintiff's activities as a member of the Camden 28 and add to our
collective knowledge of the Government's activities with respect to the
anti-war movement of the 60's. It appears the Plaintiff does not
stand to gain commercially from the disclosure of the documents and
that Plaintiff had a personal interest in the nature and substance of
the information held by the FBI concerning him.
Cunningham v. FBI, No. 78-2818, slip op. at 12-13 (D.N.J. Dec. 7, 1979).
11. The case was heard by Chief Judge Seitz and Circuit Judges Adams
and Garth. Judge Adams wrote the opinion of the court.
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reversed the award of $750,12 holding that a non lawyer pro se litigant

may not recover attorney fees in FOIA litigation.

Cunningham v. FBI,

664 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1981).

Attorney fees are not recoverable against the United States government absent an express waiver of sovereign immunity.13 While the
FOIA as originally enacted made no provision for attorney fees,'

4

the

12. 664 F. 2d at 388. The FBI sought review of only the $750 award for
attorney's fees. Id. at 383.
13. See, e.g., Aleyska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975);
United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1 (1926). The United States
Supreme Court described the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Chemical
Foundation by stating that "[t]he general rule is that, in the absence of a
statute directly authorizing it, courts will not give judgment against the United
States for costs or expenses." 272 U.S. at 20. This doctrine of sovereign immunity was later modified by 28 U.S.C. § 2412, which provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for
costs, .

.

. but not including the fees and expenses of attorneys may

be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or
against the United States or any agency or official of the United
States acting in his official capacity, in any court having jurisdiction
of such action.
28 U.S.C. §2412 (1976).
In the 1975 case of Aleyska Pipeline, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
doctrine of sovereign immunity as it pertained to the award of attorney fees
against the government. 421 U.S. at 266-71. The Aleyska Court viewed the
language of § 2412 and its legislative history as barring an award of attorney
fees unless specifically provided for by statute. Id. at 267-68. Since Congress
had reserved for itself the role of carving out exceptions to the general rule,
the Aleyska Court concluded that the courts were
not free to fashion drastic new rules with respect to the allowance of
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in federal litigation or to pick
and choose among plaintiffs and the statutes under which they sue
and to award fees in some cases, but not in others, depending upon
the courts' assessment of the importance of the public policies involved in particular cases.
Id. at 269.
For a detailed discussion of how American courts have dealt with the
issue of awarding attorney fees to the prevailing party, see Note, Attorney's
Fees in Civil Rights Actions Against the Federal Government, 29 DE PAUL
L. REv. 1177 (1980); Special Project, Recent Developments in Attorneys' Fees,
29 VAND. L. REV. 685 (1976).

14. See Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250
(1966) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976)). The Freedom of Information
Act was signed into law by President Lyndon Johnson on July 4, 1966. See
generally H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972), reprinted in
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (P.L. 93-502) SOURCE
BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 494 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FOIA SOURCE BOOK]. The law became effective one year later
on July 4, 1967. Id. at 1, FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra, at 8. The FOIA was

enacted by Congress to assure "any person" access to identifiable agency
records unless the agency can show that the requested information falls within
one of nine statutory exemptions from disclosure. Id. at 3, FOIA SOURCE
BooK, supra, at 9-10. The House report of September 20, 1972 emphasized
that under the FOIA, the federal agency has the burden of proving that requested information should not be disclosed: "Withholding of information by
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requisite statutory authorization was added by the 1974 amendments to
the Act and is codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E). 15 Section 552(a)(4)(E)
provides that a court may assess against the United States "reasonable
attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred" 16 when the
plaintiff has substantially prevailed 17 in a FOIA action. The legislative
government under the Act is permissive, not mandatory, and must be justified
on the basis of one of the nine specific exemptions permitted in the act."
Id. at 3, FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra, at 10. For the statutory exemptions to
disclosure in the FOIA, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
Legislative interest in the enactment of the FOIA began when Congressman Moss, head of the Government Information Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Government Operations, conducted hearings into government
secrecy practices. I J. O'RILLY, supra note 7, § 2.02. The hearings revealed
that government agencies were misusing the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) for the purpose of withholding information that should have been
available to the public. Id. Subsequent to these hearings, and as early as
1957, bills proposing a revision of the APA were introduced in the House and
Senate. Id. §§ 2.02-.03. However, nine years passed before the Freedom of
Information Act, designed as an amendment to § 3 of the APA, passed both
houses of Congress. Id. § 2.04; H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3

(1972), reprinted in FOIA

SOURCE BOOK,

supra, at 2.

15. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976). Shortly after the FOIA went into
effect, it was criticized as being poorly drafted. 1 J. O'REILLY, supra note 7,
§ 3.01. In 1972, the House held hearings on the Act and produced a report
recommending several amendments, which included the awarding of court
costs and attorney fees to successful plaintiffs. Id. The FOIA was amended
in 1974 after extensive Congressional hearings. 1982 EDITION OF LITIGATION
UNDER

THE FEDERAL

FREEDOM

OF INFORMATION

ACT

AND

Halperin and A. Adler eds. 1981) [hereinafter cited as

PRIVACY

ACT 4 (M.

LITIGATION UNDER THE

FOIA]. President Ford vetoed the bill amending the FOIA on October 17,
1974, but both houses overrode the veto and the amendments became effective
in February 1975. Id. at 5.
The 1974 amendments primarily addressed administrative issues and
national defense and investigatory file exemptions. Id. The procedural
changes in the FOIA introduced by the amendments related to the indexing
of documents which were not in the Federal Register, the identification of
records for a FOIA request, the fees which agencies can charge, administrative
deadlines by which FOIA requests must be processed, the release of documents
with deleted segments, in camera review of documents by the courts, de novo
review by the courts, the expediting of FOIA suits on court dockets, attorney
fees and costs, and sanctions against officials who are responsible for arbitrary
and capricious withholding of material. Id. at 5-6. In addition, the amendments restricted the scope of two exemptions in the original act-§ 552(b)(1),
dealing with the disclosure of national security information, and § 552(b)(7),
covering law enforcement investigatory records-which were narrowed in scope
to require a review of each document and the release of segregable, nonexempt
portions. Id. at 6.
16. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976).
For the text of § 552(a)(4)(E), see
note 9 and accompanying text supra.
17. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976). Courts have interpreted the "substantially prevailed" requirement to mean that "a plaintiff must show at minimum
that the prosecution of the action could reasonably have been regarded as
necessary and that the action had substantial causative effect on the delivery
of information." Vermont Low Income Advocacy Council, Inc. v. Usery, 546
F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir. 1976). Thus, a judgment is not a prerequisite to an
award of attorney fees under the FOIA. Id. Accord Nationwide Bldg.
Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704, 708-10 (D.C. Cir. 1977); American
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history 18 of this provision indicates that it was designed to insure that
attorney fees and costs would not be a barrier to persons seeking information under the FOIA. 19 Furthermore, Congress expressed its intent
to leave the award of attorney fees under section 552(a)(4)(E) to the dis20
cretion of the court.
Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Rosen, 418 F. Supp. 205, 209 (N.D. Ii. 1976);
Goldstein v. Levi, 415 F. Supp. 303, 305 (D.D.C. 1976); Kaye v. Burns, 411
F. Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
18. For the legislative history of the 1974 amendments to the FOIA, including the addition of § 552(a)(4)(E), see generally FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra
note 14. See also note 15 and accompanying text supra; notes 19-20 and
accompanying text infra.
19. See H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 73-74 (1972), reprinted in
FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 80; H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 9-10, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &cAD. NEWS 6285, 6288, and in

FOIA

SOURCE

BOOK, supra note 14, at 226-27; S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d

Sess. 17-20 (1974), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 169-72.

The House Committee noted that few individuals could afford the expense of
litigating a suit under the FOIA. H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 73
(1972), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 80. This finding
was based on statistical data which indicated that under the original FOIA
(which did not provide for an award of attorney fees), 37 of the 40 cases
brought within the first two years of the Act involved corporations or private
parties seeking information for a private claim or benefit. Id. Only three
cases involved a demand for information by the public at large, while the
media did not bring a single action under the Act. Id. The Senate Committee similarly noted that the press had failed to use the Act because of the
expense connected with litigating FOIA matters in the courts once an agency
has refused to make the desired information available. S. REP. No. 854, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1974), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14,
at 169-70.
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary unanimously endorsed the proposed amendments to the FOIA, including §552(a)(4)(E), when it issued its
Committee Report. Id. at I, FOIA SOURCE BOOK at 153. The Senate Committee found that even the simplest FOIA case involved legal expenses exceeding $1000. Id. at 18, FOIA SOURCE BOOK at 170. The Committee further stated
that "[t]he necessity to bear attorneys' fees and court costs can thus present
barriers to the effective implementation of national policies expressed by
Congress in legislation." Id. Consequently, the Committee concluded that
it was both appropriate and desirable to provide for the assessment of attorneys'
fees against the government where the plaintiff prevails in a FOIA action. Id.
The Senate Committee also cited with approval Senator Thurmond's testimony at the Senate hearing on the proposed FOIA amendments:
We must insure that the average citizen can take advantage of
the law to the same extent as the giant corporations with large legal
staffs. Often the average citizen has foregone the legal remedies
supplied by the Act because he has had neither the financial nor
legal resources to pursue litigation when his Administrative remedies
have been exhausted.
Id.
20. See H.R. REP. No. 8761, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6267, 6272, and in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra

note 14, at 126-27. The House Bill to amend § 552 provided that courts had
discretion to award attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party. id. See
also

LITIGATION UNDER THE

FOIA, supra note 15, at 125.

The Senate Bill also emphasized that courts had the discretion to award
attorney fees; however, the Senate version included four criteria to guide courts
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in the determination of when to award attorney fees. S. REP. No. 854, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1974), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14,
at 171. These criteria were: "(1) the benefit to the public, if any, deriving
from the case; (2) the commercial benefit to the complainant; (3) the nature
of the complainant's interest in the records sought; and (4) whether the
government's withholding of the records sought had a reasonable basis in
law." Id.
The Senate Committee Report then detailed how the criteria were to be
employed. Id. For example, under the first criterion, a court would award
fees "where a newsman was seeking information to be used in a publication or
a public interest group was seeking information" for a project benefiting the
general public. Id. Fees would not, however, be awarded to a business which
"was using the FOIA to obtain data relating to a competitor or as a substitute
for discovery in private litigation with the government." Id. Under the
second criterion, a court could generally allow recovery of fees if the complainant was either indigent or a nonprofit public interest group, but not if
the complainant was a large corporate interest. Id. Using the third criterion,
a court would award fees when "the complainant's interest in the information
sought was scholarly or journalistic or public-interest oriented" but no fees
would be awarded "if his interest was of a frivolous or purely commercial
nature." Id. Finally, under the fourth criterion, a court would not award
fees if "the government's withholding had a colorable basis in law." But, if
the withholding "appeared to be merely to avoid embarrassment or to frustrate
the requester," the court would generally award attorney fees. Id. The Senate
Committee Report noted that these criteria were intended to provide guidance
and discretion to the courts in determining the award of fees and were not
intended to be absolutely rigid standards. Id. The Committee also cautioned
that each criterion should be considered independently, so that "newsmen
would ordinarily recover fees even where the government's defense had a
reasonable basis in law, while corporate interests might recover where the
withholding was without such a basis." Id. at 19, FOIA SOURCE BooK at
171-72.
These statutory criteria for awarding attorney fees were deleted in the
final version of § 552(a)(4)(E). H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6285, 6288 and in FOIA
SOURcE BOOK, supra note 14, at 227. The conference committee stated that it
had deleted the criteria because they might be too delimiting. Id. In addition, the committee questioned the necessity of the criteria since the existing
body of law on awarding attorney fees recognized such factors. Id. The conference report cautioned, however, that "by eliminating these criteria, the
conferees [did] not intend to make the award of attorney fees automatic or to
preclude courts, in exercising their discretion as to awarding such fees, to take
into consideration such criteria." Id.
Notwithstanding the elimination of the criteria, these four factors were
subsequently adopted by the courts as a guideline for evaluating whether an
award of attorney fees and costs is warranted in a given FOIA case. See
Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704, 705 (D.C. Cir.
1977). Accord Crooker v. United States Dep't of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 922
(1st Cir. 1980); Cox v. United States Dep't of Justice, 601 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Blue v. Bureau of Prisons, 570 F.2d 529, 533 (5th Cir. 1978); Marschner
v. Dep't of State, 470 F. Supp. 196, 201 (D. Conn. 1979).
For examples of how courts apply the four criteria to the facts of a particular case, see Fenster v. Brown, 617 F.2d 740, 743-45 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (attorney fees not awarded to FOIA litigant for release of defense contract audit
manual where complainants sought disclosure for commercial benefit); Jones
v. United States Secret Service, 81 F.R.D. 700, 701-02 (D.D.C. 1979) (attorney
fees awarded to FOIA plaintiff who sought disclosure of information regarding
his criminal conviction because his interest was not commercial, but a liberty
interest, and because the public interest would be served by providing relief
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Although the term "attorney fees" standing by itself is unambiguous,
courts have differed in their interpretation of the phrase "reasonable
attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred" in section
552(a)(4)(E). 21 Consequently, the courts of appeals are divided on the
22
issue of whether pro se litigants are entitled to recover attorney fees.
The District of Columbia Circuit was confronted with this issue in
Cuneo v. Rumsfeld. 23 The Cuneo court held that the words "reasonably
incurred" modify only the term "litigation costs" and not the entire
phrase "reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs." 24 Under
this interpretation of section 552(a)(4)(E), the court concluded that plaintiffs need not have actually incurred attorney fees to be within the scope
to similar plaintiffs); Marschner v. Dep't of State, 470 F. Supp. 196, 201 (D.
Conn. 1979) (attorney fees awarded to federal prisoner seeking disclosure under
the FOIA of his extradition file because plaintiff's interest in the records was
not commercial); Flower v. FBI, 448 F. Supp. 567, 574 (W.D. Tex. 1978)
(attorney fees awarded to FOIA plaintiff because exposure of FBI coverage of
an individual "during a period of domestic turbulence and upheaval add
important information to the public domain").
21. See Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1089 (5th Cir. 1981).
For the full text of § 552(a)(4)(E), see note 9 and accompanying text supra.
22. For a discussion of the split in the circuits on this issue, see LITIGATION
UNDER THE FOIA, supra note 15, at 131-32.
23. 553 F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Cuneo, an attorney, brought an action
under the FOIA, requesting the release of the Defense Department's Defense
Contract Audit Manual. Id. at 1362. After the Defense Department released
the Manual, Cuneo petitioned the court for an award of attorney fees pursuant to.§ 552(a)(4)(E). Id. Since Cuneo and fellow partners in his law firm
were acting in propria persona and thus had incurred no attorney fees, the
district court found his request to be outside the scope of § 552(a)(4)(E). Id.
at 1362, 1366. The District of Columbia Circuit disagreed and reversed the
lower court's decision. Id. at 1362. For a detailed discussion of Cuneo, see
Note, Attorney Fees Under the Freedom of Information Act, 24 WAYNE L.
REV. 1045 (1978).

24. 553 F.2d at 1366, citing Holly v. Acree, 72 F.R.D. 115 (D.D.C. 1976),
aff'd sub nom. Holly v. Chasen, 569 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Cuneo
court stated that it was adopting the interpretation of the phrase used by
Judge Bryant in Holly. See 553 F.2d at 1366. In Holly, the pro se litigant
substantially prevailed in his FOIA action. 72 F.R.D. at 115. He then sought
and subsequently was granted an award of attorney fees. Id. Judge Bryant
found that the use of the word "reasonable" immediately preceding and
modifying the words "attorney fees" precluded the conclusion that the subsequent phrase, "reasonably incurred," also modified "attorney fees." Id. at
116. The Holly court stressed that more persons would be encouraged to
vindicate their FOIA rights if they were permitted to recover fees for time
spent acting as their own attorneys. Id. Furthermore, the court stated that
when persons appear pro se, they "are in every sense functioning as attorneys:
they do research, file proceedings, and advocate their cause." Id.
The Holly court also emphasized that lawyers on the staffs of organizations
were eligible for compensation at the fair market value of their services under
the FOIA. Id. The court noted that any distinction between these staff
lawyers, whom the court viewed as functioning in essentially a pro se role, and
the plaintiff would be arbitrary as it was based merely upon membership in
the bar. Id. Such an arbitrary distinction, the Holly court stated, would
erect a barrier to the vindication of FOIA rights that was contrary to Congress'
intent. Id.
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of this provision and that pro se litigants should be permitted to recover
attorney fees. 25 According to the court, this reading of the provision
better served the policy of the FOIA in that it removed barriers to the
20
vindication of FOJA rights.
The Cunco court's approach to the issue of whether pro se FOIA
litigants are eligible for attorney fees has been followed in subsequent
cases in that circuit 27 and by a district court in Connecticut. 28 Since
25. 553 F.2d at 1367. After concluding that pro se litigants are eligible
for an award of attorney fees under the FOIA, the Cuneo court addressed the
factors courts should consider in determining whether to award attorney fees to
a particular pro se litigant. Id. The court noted that the legislative history
of § 552(a)(4)(E) clearly indicated that Congress did not intend to make the
award of attorney fees automatic. Id. See note 20 and accompanying text
supra. Consequently, the Cuneo court instructed the trial court to weigh the
facts of each case against the criteria expressed in case law for awarding attorney fees and to exercise its discretion in deciding whether an award was
appropriate. 553 F.2d at 1367. The criteria that the court cited included the
factors mentioned in the Senate Committee Report. Id. at 1366, 1368, citing
S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1974). Accord Jones v. United States
Secret Service, 81 F.R.D. 700, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
26. 553 F.2d at 1366. The policy considerations which were emphasized
by the Cuneo court included not only Congress' intent to remove the barriers
facing the average person who requests information, but also the public interest
in bringing the government into compliance with the law through successful
FOIA litigation. Id. Characterizing the persons who appear in their own
behalf under the FOIA as agents of the national policy of public disclosure,
the court concluded that it was equitable to reward successful litigants for
their services. Id. The Cuneo court also noted that under current attorney
fee statutes, the courts have been willing to dispense with formal attorney and
client requirements if the social service rendered by the prevailing party is
substantial. Id., citing Clark v. American Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709
(E.D. La.), aff'd, 437 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1970).
27. See Cox v. United States Dep't of Justice, 601 F.2d 1, 5-7 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Jones v. United States Secret Service, 81 F.R.D. 700, 701 (D.D.C. 1979).
In Jones, a federal prisoner sought and obtained disclosure of records
relating to his criminal conviction. 81 F.R.D. at 701. The district court
awarded his attorney fees after considering the criteria set forth in the Senate
Committee Report. Id. at 701-02, citing Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc.
v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704 (D.D.C. 1977). For a discussion of these criteria, see
note 20 supra.
In Cox, however, the District of Columbia Circuit indicated that it had
reservations about the propriety of an award of attorney fees to a prisoner
pro se litigant under certain circumstances. See 601 F.2d at 6 & n.4. Unlike
the plaintiff in Jones, the plaintiff in Cox was not seeking information about
his own trial or conviction. See id. at 3-5. Instead, he was a federal prisoner
who had sought disclosure of the Manual for United States Marshals. Id.
The Manual contained, among other subjects, the descriptions of handcuff
combinations, the weapons and ammunition used by marshals, and the procedures involved in transporting prisoners. Id. at 4.
The District of Columbia Circuit stated that it had "doubts about whether
encouraging inmates to bring this type of litigation was in the national
interest." Id. at 6 n.4. Nevertheless, the Cox court conceded that the decision
to award attorney fees rested in the discretion of the district court. Id. at 7.
Consequently, the court remanded the case to the lower court to determine
1) whether Cox's suit had actually caused the release of the requested documents; and 2) whether, in light of the Cuneo factors, an award of attorney
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an award of attorney fees is discretionary with the court,29 those courts
allowing pro se litigants to recover attorney fees have adjusted the fees
awarded to reflect a figure which the court deems appropriate for the
work involved.80
The Fifth Circuit in Barrett v. Bureau of Customs was faced with
construing language from the Privacy Act's attorney fees provision,
which is virtually identical to that of the FOIA's section 552(a)(4)(E). 31
The Fifth Circuit's interpretation of that language, which represents
fees was appropriate when the information requested related to law enforcement and the complainant was a federal prisoner. For a discussion of the
Cuneo factors, see note 25 and accompanying text supra.
28. See Marschner v. Dep't of State, 470 F. Supp. 196 (D. Conn. 1979).
In Marschner, the court awarded attorney fees to a pro se litigant who was an
inmate at a federal prison. Id. at 201. The district court applied the criteria
set forth in the Senate Committee Report and concluded that an award of
attorney fees was appropriate. Id. The court reasoned that the public had
an interest in the proper administration of justice and therefore had benefited
from the disclosure which resulted from the action. Id.
29. For a discussion of the discretionary nature of an award of attorney
fees, see note 20 and accompanying text supra.
30. See, e.g., Jones v. United States Secret Service, 81 F.R.D. 700 (D.D.C.
1979). In Jones, the pro se FOIA plaintiff had requested $4250 in attorney
fees based upon 85 hours of work at an hourly rate of $50. Id. at 702. The
Jones court viewed the requested hourly rate as excessive for a non-attorney
and also found that the hours the plaintiff had spent preparing his suit reflected his inexperience. Id. Consequently, the court awarded Jones only
$425, a sum representing half of the hours he had originally claimed multiplied
by an hourly rate of $10. Id. See also Quinto v. Legal Times of Wash., Inc.,
511 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1981) (court reduced both fees and hourly rate requested by pro se plaintiff in a suit brought under the Copyright Act).
Even where a plaintiff has employed an attorney, a court may still adjust
the attorney fees requested. See Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American
Radiator 9: Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973). In Lindy, an
antitrust case, the Third Circuit set forth guidelines to aid district courts in
determining the proper amount for an award of attorney fees. Id. at 167.
Under the Lindy formulation, the trial court first should compute the "lodestar figure"-the attorney's hourly rate times the hours spent on the suit-and
then the court may increase or decrease this figure, depending upon an assessment of the quality of the work and the contingent nature of success. Id.
at 167-69.
The Third Circuit has also used the Lindy guidelines to determine an
award of attorney fees where the plaintiff has been represented by a legal
service organization's attorney. See Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 923 (1980). In Rodriguez, an action brought
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Third Circuit found
that the presence of an attorney-client relationship was sufficient justification
for granting attorney fees even though the prevailing party had used a legal
services attorney and had not incurred any fees. Id. at 1245-46. According
to the court, awards of attorney fees under various statutes were designed to
encourage private enforcement of individual rights, and might also deter
wrongdoing in the first instance. Id. at 1245. To avoid a windfall award to
the plaintiff, the Rodriguez court instructed that, under such circumstances,
the award of attorney fees was to accrue directly to counsel. Id.
31. 651 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1981). The Barrett court noted that the same
four criteria used for determining whether attorney fees should be awarded to
the prevailing party in a FOIA action apply when deciding whether to award
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the antithesis of the Cuneo court's approach, 32 resulted in the denial of
attorney fees to a pro se litigant. 83 According to the Barrett court,
"reasonably incurred" modifies the entire phrase "reasonable attorney
fees and other litigation costs." 34 Under this interpretation, two separate criteria must be met: 1) the amount of fees must be reasonable; 5
and 2) the incurring of such fees must be reasonable.8 6 In addition,
the Barrett court characterized the awarding of attorney fees, where none
have been incurred, as a penalty against the government.3 7 The court
further stated that it "was not persuaded that the policies and purposes
of the Privacy Act or the FOIA are necessarily furthered by granting
attorney fees to pro se litigants." 38 The First Circuit 39 and the Tenth
attorney fees under the Privacy Act. 651 F.2d at 1088. For a discussion of
these four criteria, see note 20 supra.
The Privacy Act includes an attorney fees provision virtually identical to
the FOIA's provision on attorney fees. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(B)(3)(B)
(1976) with 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E). The fee provision under the Privacy Act
reads in pertinent part: "The court may assess against the United States
reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any
case under this paragraph in which the complainant has substantially prevailed." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(l)(B)(3)(B) (1976). For the text of the FOIA's
provision on attorney fees, see note 9 supra.
32. Compare text accompanying note 34 infra with text accompanying
note 24 supra.
33. 651 F.2d at 1090.
34. Id. at 1089. The Barrett court emphatically rejected the Cuneo court's
interpretation of this phrase by stating:
The Cuneo court opined that the use of the word "reasonable"
immediately before "attorney fees" precludes the conclusion that
another phrase containing the word "reasonable" would be used to
modify "attorney fees" as well. This was apparently considered
redundant. We do not agree. We conclude that "reasonably incurred" can and does modify the larger phrase "reasonable attorney
fees and other litigation costs."
Id.
35. Id. For example, the Barrett court noted that a charge of $500 per
hour would not be reasonable and therefore the complainant would not qualify
for an award of attorney fees under the Privacy Act or the FOIA. Id.
36. Id. According to the court, the incurring of legal fees by filing a
suit when an agency has responded favorably and informed the complainant
of its intention to furnish the records but was a few days late in mailing them
would not be reasonable. Id. Consequently, the complainant would not be
eligible for the attorney fees intended by either the FOIA or the Privacy
Act. Id.
37. Id. at 1089-90. The Barrett court stated that "we are also persuaded
that Congress did not intend to impose a penalty on the United States by
requiring the payment of a sum of money to a pro se litigant, ostensibly in
reimbursement of an attorney fee expense." Id.
38. Id. at 1089. The court reasoned that persons contemplating litigation
should consult with attorneys. Id. According to the Barrett court, the result
of intervention by counsel would be "compliance with the law by the agency
involved, a furnishing of the information sought, and an avoidance of unnecessary litigation." Id. at 1090.
39. See Crooker v. United States Dep't of Justice, 632 F.2d 916 (1st Cir.
1980). In Crooker, the First Circuit held that a pro se plaintiff was not entitled
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Circuit 40 have also denied attorney fees to pro se litigants by similarly
interpreting the language of section 552(a)(4)(E) as requiring that at41
torney fees actually be incurred.
to an award for attorney fees under the FOIA, but was entitled to compensation for litigation costs actually incurred. Id. at 921-22. The court's analysis
focused primarily on policy considerations. Id. at 920-21. The court noted
that the purpose of the FOIA's attorney fees provision was neither to reward
litigants nor to penalize government agencies. Id. at 921, citing Nationwide
Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Rather, §552(a)(4)(E) was designed to eliminate the obstacle of attorney fees
so that all litigants pursuing their statutory rights would have access to the
courts. Id. at 920, citing Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc., 559 F.2d at 715.
Consequently, the First Circuit found that compensation of pro se litigants in
excess of actual costs incurred would be a windfall to the litigant, rather than
being the incentive to pursue disclosure rights which Congress had intended.
632 F.2d at 921.
The Crooker court also pointed out that an award of attorney fees in
excess of actual costs incurred in prosecuting a suit would be contrary to the
body of law governing the award of attorney fees which existed at the time
Congress enacted the provision. Id. Furthermore, the court found that the
factors courts usually considered in determining a reasonable attorney fee
award were geared towards examining the work of an attorney. Id. Thus,
determining the rate of compensation for a non-attorney "could be a very
complicated, difficult, and perhaps dangerous principle, however fair it may be
in the present case." Id., quoting Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 610 F.2d 46, 48
(1st Cir. 1979).
In addition, the Crooker court stated that it was unpersuaded by the
District of Columbia Circuit's analysis in Cuneo of the repetition of the word
"reasonable" in § 552(a)(4)(E). 632 F.2d at 921 n.7. Instead, the court said,
it was more reasonable to read the statute as requiring that attorney fees
actually be incurred. Id. For a detailed discussion of this case, see Comment,
Pro Se Litigant's Eligibility for Attorney Fee Awards Under FOIA: Crooker
v. United States Department of Justice, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 520 (1981).
40. Burke v. United States Dep't of Justice, 432 F. Supp. 251, afl'd, 559
F.2d 1182 (10th Cir. 1977). In reviewing the lower court's decision in Burke,
the Tenth Circuit simply said that it "was in full agreement with the analysis
and conclusions of the district court" without exploring further the district
court's opinion. 559 F.2d at 1182. The lower court in Burke had stated that
it had "no hesitation in concluding that this statute [§ 552(a)(4)(E)] does not
envision the assessment against the United States of arbitrary hourly rates of
compensation for the 'time and efforts' of pro se litigants." 432 F. Supp. at 253.
41. See notes 39-40 supra. See also Maxwell Broadcasting Corp. v. FBI,
490 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. Tex. 1980). After an examination of both the legislative history of § 552(a)(4)(E) and the case law construing this provision, the
Maxwell court concluded that § 552(a)(4)(E) "was not intended to reward FOIA
plaintiffs who represent themselves and who have expended no out-of-pocket
sums for legal representation." Id. at 256 & n.2. The court reasoned that
Congress' intent in providing for the award of attorney fees was to assure that
"FOIA complainants with meritorious requests not be deterred from the
legitimate pursuit of information by the usual legal expenses attendant to that
litigation." Id. at 256. Therefore, the restriction of attorney fee awards to
those situations where such fees had actually been incurred did not thwart the
purpose of § 552(a)(4)(E). Id. Congressional concern, the court stated, did not
extend to authorizing a monetary assessment against the government where no
like expense was incurred by the plaintiff. Id. Additionally, the court found
that an award to pro se litigants would be contrary to both the doctrine of
sovereign immunity and Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
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The Second Circuit in Crooker v. United States Department of the
Treasury 42 implicitly concurred with the District of Columbia Circuit's
decision in Cuneo by finding that pro se FOIA litigants may be entitled
to attorney fee awards in certain circumstances. 43 The Second Circuit's
approach is unique, however, in that the court articulated an "income
loss" test for determining when a FOIA litigant is entitled to an attorney
fees award. 44 The Crooker court noted that the statutory language
was not dispositive of the issue, 45 and therefore, it focused on statements in the legislative history that section 552(a)(4)(E) was designed
to remove those financial barriers that hindered the ability of private
individuals to secure agency compliance with the FOIA. 46 The court
reasoned that the prospect of foregoing one's regular income for a day
or more in order to prepare and pursue a pro se FOA suit constituted
4
the type of barrier that section 552(a)(4)(E) was designed to eliminate.
Accordingly, the Second Circuit concluded that a person who diverts
time from an income-producing activity in order to enforce his FOIA
rights should be eligible for an award of attorney fees because such an
48
award would effectuate the purpose of the Act.
which states that "costs against the United States, its officers and agencies shall
be imposed only to the extent permitted by law." Id. at 256 n.2, quoting
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
42. 634 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1980).

In Crooker v. United States Dep't of the

Treasury, the plaintiff was a federal prisoner who filed a pro se FOIA suit
requesting documents which related to an investigation of his 1979 tax return.
Id. One month after Crooker filed the suit, the Internal Revenue Service released the requested documents. Id. Crooker then sought an award of attorney fees and costs for the time he had spent on the suit. Id. The district court,
while assuming that a pro se litigant could be eligible for attorney fees, concluded that Crooker should not receive such an award because he "had made an
inadequate showing of his interest in the records and of any public benefit in
their disclosure." Id. at 48-49.
43. See id. at 49. See also LITIGATION UNDER THE FOIA, supra note 15,
at 132 (the Second Circuit has "implicitly endorsed the D.C. Circuit's approach"). For a discussion of the District of Columbia Circuit's approach, see
notes 23-26 and accompanying text supra.
44. 634 F.2d at 49.
45. Id. According to the Second Circuit, it was not clear from the text
of the provision "whether Congress intended 'attorney fees' to be available
only to licensed members of the bar or also to pro se litigants acting as their
own counsel." Id.
46. Id. at 49, citing S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1974), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 169-70. For a discussion of
the legislative history of the attorney fees provision, see note 20 and accompanying text supra.
47. 634 F.2d at 49.
48. See id. In applying this reasoning, the Second Circuit declined to
award Crooker attorney fees. Id. The court stated:
[W]e do not believe that Congress intended to permit an award of
attorney's fees to pro se litigants like Crooker who have made no
showing that prosecuting their lawsuits caused them to divert any of
their time from income-producing activity. The Freedom of Informa-
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The issue of whether pro se litigants can recover attorney fees has
also arisen under the Copyright Act, 49 the Truth in Lending Act, 50 and
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act. 51 Each of these acts contains provisions under which the courts have discretion to award "reasonable attorney fees" to the prevailing party. 52 However, only under the
53
Copyright Act has a pro se litigant actually been awarded attorney fees.
Under the Civil Rights and Truth in Lending Acts, courts have con54
cluded that such awards do not further the purposes of those acts.

It was against this background that the Third Circuit in Cunningham considered whether a non-lawyer pro se litigant was eligible for an
award of attorney fees under the FOIA. 5' Acknowledging that the
tion Act was not intended to create a cottage industry for federal
prisoners.
Id. (footnote omitted).
49. See Quinto v. Legal Times of Wash., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C.
1981).
50. See White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 923 (1980); Hannon v. Security Nat'l. Bank, 537 F.2d 327

(9th Cir. 1976).
51. See Davis v. Parratt, 608 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1979); Grooms v. Snyder,
474 F. Supp. 380 (N. D. Ind. 1979).
See also Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1981) (construing attorney fees provision in the Privacy Act). For a discussion of Barrett,
see notes 31-38 and accompanying text supra.
52. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1976) (Truth in Lending Act); 17 U.S.C.

§ 505 (1976) (Copyright Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act).
53. See Quinto v. Legal Times of Wash., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 579, 582

(D.D.C. 1981). The Quinto court found an award of attorney fees to a pro se
litigant to be consistent with congressional intent that the Copyright Act
be privately enforced. Id. at 581. Such an award, the court concluded, would
serve as a deterrent to copyright infringement as well as a penalty, and would
provide all litigants with equal access to the courts to vindicate their statutory
rights. Id. Furthermore, the court noted that it would also prevent "copyright infringements from going unchallenged where the commercial value of
the infringed work is small and there is no economic incentive to challenge an
infringement through expensive litigation." Id.
54. See, e.g., White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 387, 388 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 923 (1980) ("we do not think self-representation
furthers the goals of the Truth in Lending Act" because effective legal representation is dependent on legal expertise and a detached, objective perspective); Hannon v. Security Nat'l Bank, 537 F.2d 327, 328 (9th Cir. 1976) (as
general purpose of granting attorney fees is "to make a litigant whole," no
attorney fees award should be granted absent actual financial expenditure by
litigant); Davis v. Parratt, 608 F.2d 717, 718 (8th Cir. 1979) (purpose of attorney
fees provision is not to compensate pro se litigants but to allow citizens to
recover what it costs them to hire an attorney to vindicate their rights in
court); Grooms v. Snyder, 474 F. Supp. 380, 384 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (enunciated
policies of Civil Rights Fees Awards Act would not "be furthered by award
of attorney fees to lay advisor").
55. 664 F.2d at 383. The Third Circuit initially acknowledged that, while
several other courts had considered whether a non-attorney pro se litigant
could recover attorney fees under the FOIA, there was no consensus on the
subject. Id. at 384. The Cunningham court also noted that courts had found
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doctrine of sovereign immunity requires statutory authorization before
an award of attorney fees can be assessed against the United States, 56
Judge Adams turned to section 552(a)(4)(E) to determine whether it
explicitly or impliedly authorized a waiver of such immunity in actions
involving pro se litigants. 57 Finding the term "attorney fees" to be
unambiguous, 58 the court nevertheless conceded that the phrase "reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred" was
amenable to more than one interpretation. 59
Turning to the relevant authority, the Third Circuit acknowledged
that the District of Columbia Circuit in Cuneo had interpreted the
phrase as requiring that only litigation costs, and not attorney fees, need
be "reasonably incurred." 60 The Cunningham court, however, deemed
the Fifth Circuit's approach in Barrett of construing "reasonably incurred" as modifying both litigation costs and "reasonable attorney fees"
to be more compatible with the statutory language. 61 The Third Circuit
resolved the apparent redundancy in the repetition of the word "reasonpro se litigants ineligible to receive attorney fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act and the Truth in Lending Act. Id. For a discussion
of the award of attorney fees to pro se litigants under these Acts, see notes
49-54 and accompanying text supra.
56. 664 F.2d at 384. For a discussion of the relationship between the
doctrine of sovereign immunity and the award of attorney fees, see note 13
and accompanying text supra.
57. The Third Circuit stated that any analysis of the right to receive
attorney fees under the FOIA must begin with an examination of the statutory
permission for such an award, because absent an express waiver of sovereign
immunity, costs and expenses of litigation are not recoverable against the
United States. Id. For the text of § 552(a)(4)(E), see note 9 supra.
58. 664 F.2d at 384. The court noted that the provision for "attorney
fees" would appear by its own terms to be based on the presence of an attorney
and that the restrictive nature of this term was evidenced by the district
court's description of the award to Cunningham, i.e., "in lieu of attorney fees."
Id. (emphasis added by the court). The Third Circuit found this phrasing
demonstrated the lower court's apparent recognition that its award was not
within the explicit language of the statute. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id., citing Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Holly 'v.Acree, 72 F.R.D. 115, 116 (D.D.C. 1976), afl'd sub nom. Holly v.
Chasen, 569 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1977). For a discussion of the District of
Columbia Circuit's interpretation of this phrase, see note 24 and accompanying
text supra.
The Third Circuit stated that the District of Columbia Circuit's reading
of the statute led to an outcome which was difficult to harmonize with the
language of the statute. 664 F.2d at 385. According to the Cunningham
court, the District of Columbia Circuit's interpretation rendered "attorney
fees" a cash award, with no relation to any particular attorney or any particular fee and without regard to any financial burden the litigant or his
lawyer had shouldered. Id. Moreover, the court found that if attorney fees
could be awarded to litigants regardless of whether fees had actually been
incurred, the award would constitute "a cash bonus to a successful litigant as
well as a financial penalty to the defendant government agency." Id.
61. Id.
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able" by adopting the Fifth Circuit's explanation that the phrase
"reasonable" and "reasonably incurred" modified different elements of
the attorney fees award. 62 According to Judge Adams, it was plausible
to conclude, as had the Barrett court, that Congress used this phraseology
to ensure that FOIA awards would compensate plaintiffs only for a
reasonable amount of an attorney's services 63 and only for services billed
at a reasonable rate. 64 Consequently, the Third Circuit concluded that
section 552(a)(4)(E) explicitly limited the recovery of attorney fees to
those litigants who had reasonably incurred them. 65
In addition to its analysis of the statutory language, the court relied
on various additional factors which supported its position that the
phrase "attorney fees" should not be extended beyond its plain meaning.60 According to the court, pro se litigants do not experience the
financial burdens and obstacles that are encountered by those who retain
an attorney.67 Furthermore, the Third Circuit questioned whether pro
62. Id. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the phrase
"reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred," see
notes 34-36 and accompanying text supra.
63. 664 F.2d at 385. The court noted that this limitation corresponded
to the statutory term "reasonably incurred." Id.
64. Id. In the Cunningham court's view, this limitation corresponded to
the term "reasonable attorney fees." Id.
65. Id. The Third Circuit cautioned that its interpretation of § 552
(a)(4)(E) did not foreclose an attorney fee award to a litigant represented by
an attorney who does not charge a litigant for his services. Id. at 385 n.l.
The court further stated that it was not deciding whether an attorney representing himself or a litigant represented by either salaried in-house counsel or
a legal services organization could recover attorney fees. Id. For a discussion
of the Third Circuit's position regarding the award of attorney fees to litigants
represented by a legal services attorney, see note 30 supra.
The court also acknowledged that, even if a cash award were available to
pro se litigants, its availability would be subject to the trial court's discretion.
664 F.2d at 385 n.2. However, the court noted that the statutory language
permitted awards only for attorney fees incurred. Id. There was, the court
concluded, "no evidence suggesting that Congress intended to provide the
courts with the discretion to disregard this threshold requirement for eligibility." Id.
66. See 664 F.2d at 386. For a discussion of these factors, see notes 67-69
and accompanying text infra. According to the Cunningham court, none of
these factors by themselves would necessarily compel the conclusion that attorney fees under the FOIA should not be awarded to pro se parties. 664 F.2d
at 386. When taken together, however, the court found that these factors
called for "hesitation in extending the meaning of the phrase 'attorney fees'
beyond its natural domain." Id.
67. 664 F.2d at 386. The Cunningham court stated that it did not intend
to minimize the difficulty and effort involved in proceeding pro se. Id. Rather,
the court recognized that a pro se litigant might devote considerable time and
energy to his case, foregoing other possible endeavors. Id. Nonetheless, the
court believed that the pro se litigant's burden did not entail "the same
financial liabilities as those borne by one who retains an attorney and becomes
indebted for substantial sums of money." Id. Furthermore, the court noted
that litigants who employ counsel "must still devote time and energy to their
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se representation served the aims of the FOIA to the extent that representation by an attorney would.6s In addition, the court was concerned
about the valuation problems posed by compensating pro se litigants.' 9
The Third Circuit completed its analysis by examining the purposes of section 552(a)(4)(E).7 0 According to the Cunningham court, the
legislative history of the provision did not suggest that Congress enacted
section 552(a)(4)(E) to promote litigation.71 Rather, the court stressed
that Congress' express concern was simply to remove obstacles to legitimate claims. 7 2 The Third Circuit found that Congress' decision to
cases, yet the statute does not compensate them for any more than the actual

attorney fees and litigation costs incurred." Id.
68. Id. The Third Circuit stated that "self-representation does not supply
the objectivity and detachment that an outside attorney can provide as a check
against groundless or unnecessary litigation." Id., citing Barrett v. Bureau of

Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1981); White v. Arlen Realty SeDev.

Corp., 614 F.2d 387, 388-89 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 923 (1980).
69. 664 F.2d at 386. The Cunningham court acknowledged that even
valuation of an attorney's time posed difficulties for the courts and deemed
the valuation of legal services performed by a non-lawyer for himself to be "a
far thornier problem." Id. Since there was neither an accepted market value

for such services, nor a cost to serve as a baseline, the court concluded that
any value selected would be arbitrary. Id. The Third Circuit was also concerned that permitting awards to pro se plaintiffs would result in a "cottage
industry," whereby persons could earn more money by prosecuting FOIA suits
than by pursuing other available activities. Id. citing Crooker v. Department
of Treasury, 634 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1980).
The Third Circuit also considered and rejected the Second Circuit's approach in Crooker under which a pro se litigant may recover attorney fees if
he has foregone some income-producing activity in prosecuting his FOIA suit.
Id. For the Crooker court's approach, see note 48 and accompanying text
supra. The Cunningham court noted that under this approach, attorney fees
would be made available, and perhaps measured, according to the monetary
value of the time required to prosecute the case. 664 F.2d at 387. As a result,
the court reasoned, compensation would be made available in inverse proportion to the litigant's likely financial need, and therefore, the statute would
offer little aid to those persons who, lacking income or financial resources, have
the greatest difficulty in obtaining counsel. Id. This outcome, the Third
Circuit concluded, could not have been intended by Congress. Id.
70. See id. at 387-88; notes 71-74 and accompanying text infra.
71. 664 F.2d at 387, citing S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1974),
reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 169. The Third Circuit
viewed the payment of attorney fees to pro se litigants as an affirmative incentive, in the form of financial gain, to an individual's vindication of his
rights under the FOIA. Id. However, the court regarded such an incentive
to pro se litigants as beyond the scope of the attorney fees provision. Id.
The court further noted that "no class of persons is necessarily limited to
pro se status" and that § 552(a)(4)(E) provided an incentive for private attorneys to take FOIA cases on a contingent basis. Id. at 387 n.3. The court also
stressed the availability of legal services organizations to service indigent
claimants. Id.
72. Id. at 387. The Cunningham court found this concern expressed in
a portion of the Senate Report to the 1974 FOIA amendments, stating: "Too
often the barriers presented by court costs and attorneys' fees are insurmountable for the average person requesting information, allowing the government
to escape compliance with the law." Id., quoting S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong.,
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compensate only for costs actually incurred 7 reflected a balance among
several competing concerns.7 4 Thus, the court concluded that judicial
deviation from this balance, which had been articulated by Congress
with "reasonable clarity," could not be justified "simply because a different outcome would further one of the several policies that Congress
had taken into account." 75

It is suggested that the Cunningham court's denial of attorney fees
to pro se litigants cannot be reconciled with accepted principles of
statutory construction 76 and is inconsistent with the policy concerns
expressed by Congress in enacting the FOIA. 77

Once a court determines

that a statute is ambiguous, it should look to the legislative history to
determine how the statute should be construed. 7" Since the phrase
"reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred"
2d Sess. 17 (1974), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 169.
According to the Third Circuit, the statutory language used by Congress was
designed "quite plainly" to remove these specific financial barriers. 664 F.2d
at 387. Had Congress intended to do more than lift financial barriers, the
court stated, it would have authorized punitive damages or some other type of
noncompensatory award. Id.
73. 664 F.2d at 387. As the court noted, nothing in § 552(a)(4)(E) pre-

cluded pro se litigants from recovering litigation costs actually incurred. Id.
at 387 n.4. Cunningham had, in fact, been awarded $523 for such costs, an
award which the government did not contest on appeal. Id. at 383, 387 n.4.
Thus, the court stressed, even with pro se litigants, the government is still
faced with the prospect of a financial penalty when it improperly refuses a
FOIA request. Id. at 387 n.4. The Third Circuit conceded that an award

of attorney fees to a pro se litigant might provide additional deterrence to
governmental violations under the FOIA. Id. at 387. However, the court
concluded that the deterrent effect resulting from an award of litigation costs
to pro se litigants was not significantly less than that resulting from an award
of both litigations costs and attorney fees to pro se parties. Id.
74. Id. The court suggested that the following concerns were important
to Congress: "enforcement of individual rights under the Act, encouragement
of compliance by government agencies and officials, avoidance of frivolous lawsuits, and the protection of the public fisc against unwarranted expenses." Id.
75. Id. The Third Circuit acknowledged that attorney fee awards to

pro se litigants might further some of the policies underlying the enactment
of § 552(a)(4)(E). Id. However, the court found that, while such awards may
further some of the interests articulated by Congress, by increasing the enforcement of legitimate rights, "it may disserve others by encouraging lawsuits aimed
more at recovering fees than at uncovering the requested documents." Id.
76. See notes 78-81 and accompanying text infra.
77. See notes 82-92 and accompanying text infra.
78. See 2A J.

SUTHERLAND

&

C.

SANDS,

STATUTES

AND

STATUTORY

CON-

§ 48.03 (4th ed. 1973). When attempting to construe a statute, "it
is the well established practice in American legal processes to consider the
STRUCTION

relevant information about the historical background of the enactment of the
statute." Id. The benefit of this historical analysis is that it often reveals

"the circumstances under which the statute was passed, the mischief at which
it was aimed, and the object it was supposed to achieve." Id. These historical
insights can help a court "to reach a composite judgment as to interest or

meaning."

Id.
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was amenable to differing interpretations, 79 the Third Circuit should
have acknowledged that the language of section 552(a)(4)(E) was not dispositive of the issue.80 Then, the court should have followed accepted
canons of statutory construction 8l and determined which interpretation
would better serve the policies underlying the FOIA.
It is further suggested that the court's conclusion that pro se litigants are ineligible for attorney fees is not supported by either the
purpose of section 552(a)(4)(E) or the policies expressed in the FOIA.S2
Although the Cunningham court stated that "Congress' express concern
was to remove obstacles to legitimate claims," 83 it did not proffer an
explanation of why attorney fee awards to pro se litigants would not
further this goal.8 4 In fact, two of the congressional concerns mentioned
by the Third Circuit-enforcement of individual rights under the Act
and encouragement of agency compliance 85-would be better served by
allowing pro se litigants to recover attorney fees.8 6 The only congres79. See 664 F.2d at 384.
80. See Crooker v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48. The

Crooker court first examined the language of § 552(a)(4)(E).

Id. at 49.

Find-

ing that the language of the statute was not "dispositive of the issue," the
Crooker court turned to the legislative history to interpret Congress' intent in
enacting the statute. Id. By utilizing this analytical approach, the Crooker
court avoided substituting its views for congressional intent. For a discussion
of Crooker, see notes 42-48 and accompanying text supra.
81. For a discussion of the methodology of statutory construction, see note
78 and accompanying text supra. Instead of examining the historical back-

ground of the statute in order to determine the statute's meaning, the Cunningham court adopted one of two equally plausible interpretations of § 552
(a)(4)(E), followed by an articulation of congressional policies which would
support its predetermined interpretation of the statute. See 664 F.2d at
384-85, 387.
82. For a discussion of the purpose and policies underlying § 552(a)(4)(E),
as evidenced by the legislative history, see note 19 and accompanying text
supra. For the district court's articulation of congressional policy in Cunningham, see note 10 supra.
83. 664 F.2d at 387. For statements of congressional intent in enacting
§ 552(a)(4)(E), see note 19 and accompanying text supra.
84. See 664 F.2d at 387.
85. Id. See note 74 supra.
86. These two concerns are mentioned repeatedly in the legislative history
of § 552(a)(4)(E). See, e.g., 120 CONG. Rac. 6814 (1974) (statement of Rep.
Alexander); 120 CONG. REc. 17,020 & 17,022 (statements of Senators Kennedy
and Muskie); S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1974), reprinted in FOIA
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 169; H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
73 (1972), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 80.
An award of attorney fees to successful pro se litigants would seem to
further both of these concerns. Persons with meritorious claims would be
more likely to bring suit under the FOIA if they knew that they would suffer
no financial losses from litigating a successful suit. Furthermore, if the government had to pay legal fees each time it lost a case, it would be more prone to
oppose only those cases which presented a strong likelihood of success. See
S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1974), reprinted in FOIA SouRcE
BOOK,supra note 14, at 169.
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sional concern which the court noted that would militate against such
an award-the protection of the public treasury against unwarranted
expenses 87-was never mentioned in the legislative history of the act. 88
Moreover, allowing pro se litigants to recover attorney fees would,
in fact, best effectuate Congress' purpose in enacting section 552
Congress addressed the third concern cited by the court-the avoidance of
frivolous lawsuits-by stating that "[c]ourts have assumed inherent equitable
powers to award fees and costs to the defendant if a lawsuit is determined to
be frivolous and brought for harassment purposes; this principle would continue, as before, to apply to FOIA cases." S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 20 (1974), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 172.
87. See 664 F.2d at 387. The court, however, could only infer that "the
protection of the public fisc against unwarranted expenses" was a congressional
concern. See note 88 and accompanying text infra.
88. See generally FOIA SOURCE BooK, supra note 14. Since the legislative
history of § 552(a)(4)(E) makes no mention of this concern, it is submitted that
it should not have formed the basis for the court's argument that providing
attorney fees to pro se litigants does not serve all of the congressional policies
underlying § 552(a)(4)(E). See 664 F.2d at 387.
In addition, the other factors which were emphasized by the court to support its holding are not persuasive. For a discussion of these factors, see
notes 66-69 and accompanying text supra. For example, the court's fear that
pro se litigants might prosecute FOIA suits in lieu of pursuing other activities
is unfounded. Given the contingent nature of success and the criteria which
must be satisfied before a court will award attorney fees, it is difficult to
imagine that persons will forego other activities on the chance that if they
substantially prevail in a FOIA action, the court might award them attorney
fees. See notes 17 & 20 and accompanying text supra. Even in those circumstances which may warrant concern over excessive litigation by pro se complainants-the prisoner litigant, for example-the courts can grant attorney fees
only in instances where the government should be penalized for its opposition
to the plaintiff's initial FOIA request. This approach is analogous to the
Senate Committee Report's statement that when a plaintiff has pursued a FOIA
suit to further his own financial interest, there is no need to award attorney
fees "unless the government officials have been recalcitrant in their opposition
to a valid claim or have been otherwise engaged in obdurate behavior." S.
REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1974), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 14, at 171. For a discussion of the treatment of attorney fee requests by prisoner pro se FOIA litigants, see notes 27-28, 42-48 and accompanying text supra.
Equally unpersuasive is the court's rationale that the award of attorney
fees to pro se litigants would involve troublesome valuation problems. See 664
F.2d at 386. Courts are frequently faced with valuation problems in awarding
attorney fees, See note 30 and accompanying text supra. Since courts in the
Third Circuit routinely make upward or downward adjustments in fees requested by an attorney, depending upon the court's assessment of the work
involved, there is no apparent reason why courts cannot make a similar
evaluation when a litigant is acting pro se. Id.
Furthermore, the Cunningham court failed to explain or justify why
attorney fees are improper when a pro se litigant is involved, yet proper in
other situations where a litigant has incurred no counsel fees. See 664 F.2d
at 385 nn.1 & 2. For example, the Third Circuit permits attorney fees awards
to litigants who have been represented by a legal services organization even
though they have not incurred any financial liability. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
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(a)(4)(E).S9 According to Congress, this provision was enacted in order
to eliminate the financial barriers which prevent persons from bringing
FOIA suits. 90 Time lost from a job and the concomitant wage loss 9 '
is the type of financial barrier which would inhibit a potential pro se
litigant from bringing suit and which Congress sought to overcome in
92
enacting section 552(a)(4)(E).
Although the Third Circuit suggested that legal services organizations could be used by persons unable to afford an attorney,9 3 cutbacks
94
in government funding are threatening the survival of such groups.
The Third Circuit's holding in Cunningham thus makes it conceivable
that the "average person" might forego the legal remedies supplied by
the FOJA simply because he has neither the financial nor the legal re89. See notes 90-92 and accompanying text infra.
90. See H.R.

REP.

No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, reprinted in 1974 U.S.

8: AD. NEWs 6267, 6272, and in FOIA

SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14,
at 126-27; S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1974), reprinted in
FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14, at 169-70; 120 CONG REC. 6814 (1974)
(statement of Rep. Alexander) ("The committee feels strongly that no plaintiff
should be forced to suffer any irreparable damage because the government
failed to live up to the letter and spirit of the Freedom of Information Act");
120 CONG. REc. 17,020 (1974), reprinted in FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 14
at 297 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (§ 552(a)(4)(E) by authorizing "discretionary
assessment of attorneys' fees and costs against the Government . . . would
eliminate another major obstacle to public access to information"). See also
note 19 and accompanying text supra.
Since Congress' stated intent was to remove the financial barriers confronting FOIA litigants, it is submitted that the ambiguity in § 552(a)(4)(E)
should be interpreted by the courts as implicitly allowing deserving pro se
litigants to recover attorney fees for acting as their own attorneys. This interpretation would provide the statutory authority necessary to waive the government's sovereign immunity. See notes 13, 56-57 and accompanying text supra.
CODE CONG.

91. Since the legislative history of § 552(a)(4)(E) clearly states that the
provision was aimed at aiding the average person, a denial of an award to the
"average person" of attorney fees for time that he spent acting as his own
attorney seems contrary to the spirit of the provision. For a discussion of
Congress' intent in enacting this provision, see note 19 and accompanying
text supra. Under the Cunningham holding, a wage-earning pro se litigant
might be deterred from vindicating his FOIA rights, while a prisoner, who
has no wages to lose, would not be. Thus, the Second Circuit's approach in
Crooker-awarding attorney fees to pro se litigants who have given up an
income-producing activity to prosecute their FOIA suits-appears to be more
consistent with congressional intent than either a refusal to award any pro se
litigant attorney fees or the granting of fees to a prisoner pro se litigant. For
additional discussion of the Crooker court's approach, see notes 42-48 and
accompanying text supra.
92. For a discussion of Congress' intent in enacting § 552(a)(4)(E) as
evidenced in the legislative history of the provision, see note 19 and accompanying text supra.
93. 664 F.2d at 387 n.3.
94. See generally Ehrlich, Save the Legal Services Corporation, 67 AB.A.
J. 434 (1981); Legal Services, 67 A.B.A. J. 390 (1981); Legal Services Future, 67
A.B.A. J. 674 (1981).
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sources to pursue litigation after his administrative remedies have been
exhausted. 95
Kathleen A. Frederick
95. See Senator Thurmond's statement, supra note 19.
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